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INTRODUCTION 
Judge Rodney Gilstrap has a lot of patent cases on his docket.  In fact, 
in 2015 there were 1,686 patent cases that were filed and assigned to 
Judge Gilstrap, an astronomical number for a single judge.1  Judge 
Gilstrap—one of eight federal judges who sit on the Eastern District of 
Texas—is so popular with patent plaintiffs that over one-fourth of all 
patent cases in the country are filed with him.2  Many of these cases never 
get near trial, instead they settle out of court quickly after the complaint 
is filed.  But many are time-consuming affairs that not only require 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  This Article is 
based on a speech given at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law at the Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal’s symposium on judicial decision making.  I would like to thank the staff of 
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for all of their efforts in shaping this article.  I would 
also like to thank Matthew Sag, Greg Reilly, and Dan Klerman for helpful comments.  As always, 
thanks to my wife Jenn for her support. 
1. Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases, 
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-small-town-
judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.  See Brian Howard, Lex Machina 2015 End-
of-Year Trends, LEX MACHINA: LEXISNEXIS COMPANY (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://lexmachina.com/lex-machina-2015-end-of-year-trends/ (explaining that 2,540 patent cases 
(over 43 percent of the nation’s patent cases) were filed in Judge Gilstrap’s home district, the 
Eastern District of Texas). 
2. Along with Judge Gilstrap, Judges Marcia Crone, Amos Mazzant, Robert Schroeder, Richard 
Shell, Thad Heartfield, Michael Schneider, and Ron Clark (Chief Judge) are the other judges 
currently sitting on the Eastern District of Texas.  District Judges, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF 
TEX., http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info (last visited Nov. 18, 2016). 
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hundreds of hours of the litigants’ time, but demand the attention of Judge 
Gilstrap as well.3  Many of the patent cases that end up on Judge 
Gilstrap’s docket involve multi-billion dollar corporations such as Apple, 
Microsoft, and Google.4  And while many of the cases involving these 
large corporations eventually settle, a significant number do not and must 
be tried.  Judge Gilstrap presides over these cases at whichever stage they 
are in litigation: from recently filed cases which have little more than a 
complaint filed, to trials in front of the notoriously generous juries of the 
Eastern District of Texas.5 
How could one judge possibly handle the enormous amount of patent 
cases that Judge Gilstrap handles?  First of all, he has help.  Unlike most 
federal district court judges who only have the funding to hire two law 
clerks every year, Judge Gilstrap hires an additional third law clerk.6  
Judge Gilstrap’s clerks are usually recent law graduates who 
demonstrated excellence in law school, just like the majority of federal 
judicial clerks.7  Unlike the majority of federal law clerks, however, 
Judge Gilstrap’s clerks often possess a technical background in addition 
to their law degree.  These clerks possess aptitude in a certain technical 
field or with the theoretical background to more efficiently handle patent 
cases.8  These clerks undoubtedly make Judge Gilstrap’s job easier, 
 
3. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1579 
(2016) (noting that disclosure—one patent doctrine among many—is fact intensive and “fraught 
with difficulty”). 
4. Consider the $533 million decision against Apple over a patent owned by Smartflash, LLP.  
Susan Decker, Apple Wins New Trial Over $533 Million Patent Damage Award, BLOOMBERG: 
TECH. (July 8, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-08/apple-
wins-new-trial-over-533-million-patent-damage-award. 
5. As others and I have noted elsewhere, the Eastern District of Texas’ juries have been catnip 
for plaintiff’s attorneys.  For example, in the 1980s, it is estimated that one in three civil cases was 
an asbestos case—the Eastern District was targeted long before patent lawyers came to it.  Deborah 
R. Hensler, As Time Goes by: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 
1900 (2001–2002). 
6. See The Honorable Rodney Gilstrap, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=17 (last visited Nov. 28, 
2016) (discussing the position, title, and name of Judge Gilstrap’s chamber staff); see also Ryan 
Davis, Eastern Texas Judge Has Nation’s Busiest Patent Docket, LAW360 (May 13, 2014, 7:42 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/536886/eastern-texas-judge-has-nation-s-busiest-patent-
docket (noting that Judge Gilstrap has three law clerks, not the usual two, “which has helped to 
manage his docket”). 
7. For example, note the profile of Leslie Honey Tronche, Judge Gilstrap’s first law clerk.  
Leslie Honey Tronche, BECK REDDEN LLP: TRIAL & APP. ATTORNEYS, 
http://www.beckredden.com/bios/honey-leslie (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).  She graduated from 
Baylor University School of Law in 2011, where she served as Executive Editor of the Baylor Law 
Review immediately before clerking for Judge Gilstrap.  Id. 
8. See Judge Gilstrap (ED TX, Marshall) Now Hiring for March 2015 Clerkship, TEX. LAW 
(Sept. 19, 2014), https://law.utexas.edu/judicial-clerkships/2014/09/19/judge-gilstrap-ed-tx-
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although a specific technical background is certainly not relevant in all 
1,686 patent cases spanning all manner of technologies.   
In addition to an extra law clerk, Judge Gilstrap also relies quite 
heavily on magistrate judges to handle certain aspects of his caseload.  
For example, magistrates might assist him with claim construction—the 
most contentious issue in many patent cases9—by handling the pretrial 
Markman hearing.10  Additionally, his magistrates assist him with other 
aspects of litigation, including handling, scheduling, and nondispositive 
motions.11 
In addition to magistrate judges and law clerks, Judge Gilstrap, like all 
federal district court judges, enjoys the assistance of a capable group of 
staff and administrators that take care of many of the administrative 
details involved in churning through a docket of over 1,600 patent cases 
annually.  Undoubtedly, the staff, law clerks, and magistrate judges who 
assist Judge Gilstrap help make the seemingly impossible task of 
processing such a large number of cases possible. 
The second way he manages such a large patent docket is by 
employing notoriously strict local rules.  Law clerks, magistrate judges, 
and staff can only do so much to assist a judge in judging.  Judge Gilstrap 
is armed not only with an experienced support team, but also with 
powerful local rules that encourage settlement, minimize disputes that 
require the judge to intervene, and hurriedly race toward trial.12  The 
 
marshall-now-hiring-for-march-2015-clerkship/ (“Judge Gilstrap has the largest patent docket in 
the country and appreciates applicants who have a science or engineering background.”). 
9. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and 
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2014) (describing 
the importance of claim construction); J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the 
Fact/Law Distinction in Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L REV. COLLOQUY 187, 197–99 
(2015) (suggesting a new approach to appellate review of claim construction decisions). 
10. Magistrates can issue nondispositive motions, such as Markman orders, in one of three 
ways: first, the case may be referred to a magistrate for all nondispositive motions, 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1)(A) (allowing magistrate judges to hear and determine pre-trial matters pending before 
the court); second, the case may be referred to a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and give a 
report and recommendation on the final outcome to the judge in the case, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); 
third, both parties can consent in writing to have the magistrate conduct all aspects of the case, 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
11. Currently, a single magistrate judge assists Judge Gilstrap with his Marshall docket—the 
Honorable Roy Payne—while two magistrates split his Tyler docket—the Honorable John Love 
and the Honorable Nicole Mitchell.  General Order Re: Divisional Assignment and Apportionment 
of Cases among United States Magistrate Judges 15-3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=general&all=1. 
12. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 666–
77 (2015) (highlighting the tools with which courts can compete for patent litigation); Daniel 
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250–70 (2016) (illustrating the 
ways in which the Eastern District of Texas attracts cases). 
12_ANDERSON_DOCUMENT7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  2:18 PM 
542 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
Eastern District of Texas has earned the nickname “rocket docket” 
because patent trials tend to get to trial so much more quickly in Eastern 
Texas than other courts.13  The local rules of the Eastern District of Texas 
are modeled after similar rules in the Northern District of California that 
were designed to create uniform treatment of patent cases.14  But the 
Eastern District of Texas’ rules differ from the Northern District of 
California in certain key respects.15  Aside from speeding up the time to 
trial, the local rules of the Eastern District of Texas require the parties to 
resolve a number of key issues before trial.  Also, scheduling orders are 
strict and unforgiving of delays.16  For a time, parties could not file 
summary judgment motions with Judge Gilstrap without previous 
approval.17  This tends to keep motions practice to a minimum.  These 
two factors—speed to trial and minimized motions practice—help Judge 
Gilstrap maintain his docket because parties are encouraged to settle.  
Rather than rack up large bills trying a case all the way to a verdict, many 
cases settle along the way or are dismissed.18  Realistically, this is a 
necessity when faced with the number of patent cases on Judge Gilstrap’s 
docket. 
Aggressive rules and an experienced staff can only do so much of the 
judicial work, however.  Much of the credit for Judge Gilstrap’s ability 
to manage his docket rightly falls on his shoulders.  Judge Gilstrap is a 
hardworking judge who is known for his preparation on the bench.19  He 
 
13. The Eastern District of Texas is not the fastest court in the United States, but it is quick; 
time to trial is 2.3 years, compared to a median of 2.4 years for other patent heavy districts.  Klerman 
& Reilly, supra note 12, at 267 n.147. 
14. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 652–53 (comparing the Eastern District of Texas’ rules for 
case management in patent cases to the Northern District of California’s rules and noting that most 
cases that rise up from Silicon Valley, a technology hub, are usually filed in the Northern District 
of California). 
15. Id. 
16. Id.  Sample Docket Control Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and 
Judge Roy Payne, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (listing three excuses that do not warrant a continuance, 
including having to appear in another court on the same day). 
17. Standing Order Regarding Letter Briefs, Motions in Limine, Exhibits, Deposition 
Designations, and Witness Lists (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2014) (“Prior to filing any summary judgment 
motion . . . the parties must submit a letter brief . . . seeking permission to file the motion.”). 
18. See, e.g., John Council, Gilstrap Dismisses 168 Patent Cases, Considers Attorney Fees, 
TEX. LAW. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202738410659/Gilstrap-Dismisses-
168-Patent-Cases-Considers-Attorney-Fees (reporting on a case in which Judge Gilstrap dismissed 
168 cases filed by eDekka, LLC). 
19. See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 72 (2011) (statement of Senator Cornyn) (presenting Judge Gilstrap and 
praising him as “the best and brightest”); Robin Y. Richardson, Gilstrap Tapped to Be Federal 
Judge, MARSHALL NEWS MESSENGER (May 20, 2011, 2:17 AM), 
https://www.marshallnewsmessenger.com/news/2011/may/20/gilstrap-tapped-to-be-federal-
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has undoubtedly spent a great deal of time preparing for and conducting 
the trials that come his way.  He reports that his experience as a litigator 
in Marshall, Texas prepared him for the bench: “‘I had a small-town 
practice for 30 years, where if you aren’t doing it, it didn’t get done’ the 
judge has said.  ‘So I’m not averse to hard work; I’ve been doing it my 
whole life.’”20 
But one cannot help but ask whether society should place one-fourth 
of the nation’s patent cases before one jurist when there is a federal 
judiciary of around 700 judges who are available to take some of the 
burden off Judge Gilstrap’s shoulders.21  Should the concentration of 
almost one-third of the nation’s patent decision making be in one man’s 
hands, regardless of how skilled that judge is?  This Article proposes that 
it should not and argues that the high concentration of patent cases is 
unhealthy for the patent system and for the federal judiciary in general.  
One, if not the primary, reason that this concentration is unhealthy for the 
judicial system is that it is largely the result of “judge shopping”—the 
ability of patent plaintiffs to choose their judge.22  Judge shopping is 
almost universally reviled, yet patent law generally turns a blind eye to 
this massive advantage for plaintiffs. 
Part I discusses the current system of judge shopping that occurs in the 
Eastern District of Texas.  Part II then moves into the arguments for and 
against judge shopping generally.  Part II concludes that the vast majority 
of scholarship on the topic is against judge shopping for reasons of 
judicial legitimacy.  In addition to the concerns about the fairness (both 
real and perceived) of judge shopping, this Article argues against judge 
shopping that is initiated or enabled by federal courts. Court-enabled 
judge shopping is often a sign that a court is in the business of competing 
for cases.  It is this competition that poses the greatest threat to judicial 
impartiality.  Part III concludes by proposing a way to root out judge 
shopping in patent cases.  Some sort of venue reform is desperately 
needed in patent law.  Either congressional action or changes from the 
Supreme Court are required to more evenly distribute the patent cases 
across the country. 
 
judge/ (quoting a county commissioner’s remarks regarding Judge Gilstrap: “He was always an 
example of a good leader with values, and his work ethics are admirable”). 
20. Jess Krochtengel, Judge Gilstrap Keeps Eastern District’s Tight Ship Afloat, LAW360 (Mar. 
6, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/628732/judge-gilstrap-keeps-eastern-district-
s-tight-ship-afloat. 
21. Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls Go to Texas?  It’s Not for the BBQ, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/why-do-
patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq. 
22. Anderson, supra note 12, at 642–45. 
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I.  JUDGE SHOPPING IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS: THE DISTRICT’S 
UNIQUE CASE ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
Before discussing the theoretical implications of judge shopping, it is 
important to have a firmly established picture of how judge shopping 
occurs in the Eastern District of Texas.  Litigators report that the judge 
assigned to a case can be the key to winning that case.23  Judges each 
have individual personalities and therefore have reputations based on 
those personalities, e.g., some judges are thought to be irrational, 
curmudgeonly, or unfair while others are viewed as evenhanded, calm, or 
easygoing.24  Because of this, litigants prefer certain judges over others.  
Most districts have procedures for assigning cases that limit the ability of 
any particular litigant to select any particular judge.25  This random 
selection of judges is thought to be beneficial because it enhances public 
confidence in the judicial selection process.26  This system does not 
guarantee fairness, but it attempts to ensure that each case has roughly 
the same odds of landing before any particular judge. 
But one quirk of the federal judicial system is that the power of 
assignment rests entirely with the court.  That means that a court, usually 
by way of the chief judge of a district, is responsible for establishing 
which judge will acquire which case and how a case will be reassigned—
if at all—based on workload.27  This power to assign cases can be a very 
useful tool to redirect certain litigants toward or away from a particular 
court. 
Two districts—the Eastern District of Texas and the Eastern District 
of Virginia—have tinkered with their case assignment procedures with 
an eye toward impacting patent litigation filings.28  The Eastern District 
 
23. One can gather proof of this maxim by recognizing that judge shopping receives universal 
contempt from jurists, whereas forum shopping receives mixed reviews.  See Kimberly Jade 
Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 
300–01 (1996) (comparing the judicial system’s differing views on forum shopping and judge 
shopping). 
24. See Weyman I. Lundquist, The New Art of Forum Shopping, 11 LITIG. 21, 22 (1985) 
(discussing forum shopping strategies used to avoid “Judge Curmudgeon”). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting that 
random assignment “prevents judge shopping by any party” and therefore enhances “public 
confidence in the assignment process”). 
26. Id. 
27. Lynn LoPucki demonstrated that the single-judge nature of Delaware’s bankruptcy court 
was a boon for attracting litigants in the 1990s because litigants who filed in Delaware knew the 
judge for their case ex ante.  See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR 
BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING BANKRUPTCY COURTS 47–48 (2006) (noting that the single-judge 
nature reduces the effectiveness of the bankruptcy process and that courts would compete by 
reforming their rules to meet the demands of litigants). 
28. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 651–54, 656–59 (illustrating that the two districts have 
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of Virginia has made alterations to its case assignment procedure that 
discourage patentees from filing there.  The Eastern District of Virginia 
has three divisions: Alexandria, Norfolk, and Richmond.29  Before 2002, 
civil litigants were randomly assigned a judge within the division where 
the case was filed.30  Therefore, every patent case (and all other civil 
cases) was randomly assigned to a judge among the population of judges 
within the division.  Most patent plaintiffs preferred to file in the 
Alexandria division because of its proximity to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and Washington, D.C. law firms, the 
predictable trial management of patent cases, and the division’s 
experience in handling patent cases.31 
In 2002, the Alexandria division received up to sixty patent case filings 
per month, a number that made it impossible for the court to maintain its 
speedy reputation.32  To reduce the flood of patent litigants, the Eastern 
District of Virginia changed its case assignment procedures.33  The new 
assignment procedure stipulated that patent cases (and only patent cases) 
filed in the Alexandria division were to be randomly reassigned among 
the judges of all three divisions.34  Other types of cases, such as criminal 
or copyright cases, continue to be heard by a judge within the division in 
which the case was filed.  Therefore, a copyright case filed in the 
Alexandria Division can only be heard by one of the seven judges in that 
 
changed their case assignment procedures in an effort to influence where cases are filed). 
29. Dabney J. Carr, IV & Robert A. Angle, Litigating Patent Infringement Cases in the “Rocket 
Docket” of the Eastern District of Virginia, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (June 2010). 
30. See Dabney J. Carr, IV and Robert A. Angle, Traps for the Unwary: Litigating Intellectual 
Property Cases in the Rocket Docket, 11 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP. 1, 7 n.3 (2003) 
(“Previously, the Alexandria division did not assign cases to particular judges until trial.  For 
hearings or proceedings prior to trial, parties were assigned randomly to any of the judges in the 
division.”). 
31. The Alexandria division has a reserved day for nondispositive motions hearings, whereas 
the Norfolk and Richmond divisions do not.  In the Alexandria division, unlike the Richmond 
division, discovery and nondispositive motions are heard by magistrates.  The Alexandria division, 
unlike the Norfolk division, always has at least one judge available to rule on emergency motions.  
Id. at 4–5. 
32. Dana D. McDaniel, Patent Litigation on the Rocket Docket After Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., VA. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 20, 23 n.1. 
33. Carr & Angle, supra note 30, at 1 (describing the assignment procedure which randomly 
assigns cases among the speedy Alexandria docket as well as Norfolk and Richmond); see also 
Lloyd Smith, Profiles in IP Law: An Interview with Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, United States District 
Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 6 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. LAW: LANDSLIDE 7, 9 (Nov.–
Dec. 2013) (“One of the reasons we decided as a court to randomly assign patent cases is because 
we realized we were being overwhelmed here in Alexandria—this being a preferable venue for 
many plaintiff’s counsel and entities that can find a way to bring their cases here.  We decided to 
spread the cases around and it has helped us greatly.”). 
34. Carr & Angle, supra note 30, at 2. 
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division, yet a patent case filed in the same courthouse can be assigned to 
any judge in the Eastern District of Virginia.  Under the new rules, a 
litigant expecting to try his or her patent case before the experienced 
judges in Alexandria might find himself or herself litigating before a less 
experienced patent jurist in Norfolk or Richmond. 
But this change only applied to patent cases.  The changes made in 
2002 increased the uncertainty of judge and divisional assignment of 
patent cases, and only patent cases.35  The increased unpredictability of 
judge assignment has reduced the appeal of the district to patent 
litigants.36  As a result, the Eastern District of Virginia has not attracted 
patent cases at nearly the same rate as the Eastern District of Texas in 
recent years.37 
Like the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern District of Texas has, 
over the years, modified its case assignment procedure for patent cases.  
Unlike its counterpart in Virginia, however, the Eastern District of Texas 
altered its procedures in a plaintiff-friendly manner.  In essence, the 
District created a means of judge shopping.38  The Eastern District of 
Texas is split into six divisions: Texarkana, Marshall, Sherman, 
Beaumont, Tyler, and Lufkin.39  Because the Eastern District of Texas 
can have up to eight active judges, a random case assignment procedure 
would force litigants to risk assignment to a judge who has handled 
relatively few patent cases or who dislikes patent cases entirely.40  To 
reduce the risk of drawing an unsatisfactory judge for a patent case, the 
Eastern District of Texas adopted a case assignment system that allows 
plaintiffs to select a particular judge.41 
The district’s case assignment system is nominally random.42  But the 
chief judge, in accordance with his powers under 28 U.S.C. § 137, 
 
35. Id. 
36. See Smith, supra note 33, at 9 (indicating that the random assignment system has served its 
purpose in reducing Alexandria’s patent docket). 
37. See Roderick McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report for 2006, 
19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (summarizing patent case filings to show that the Eastern 
District of Virginia “continues to lag behind other districts in attracting patent cases”). 
38. Anderson, supra note 12, at 635; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 258. 
39. See Divisions, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
40. See Mike McKool, Founder of McKool Smith in Dallas, TEX. LAW., 
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202520214208 (lasted visited Nov. 28, 2016) (espousing 
lawyers’ fear that Judge Marcia Crane would preside over their patent case given that she had little 
experience and seemed not to like this type of case). 
41. Anderson, supra note 12, at 671; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 258. 
42. Brooke Terpening, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 5418, 4 FIU L. 
REV. 287, 311 (2008). 
12_ANDERSON_DOCUMENT7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  2:18 PM 
2016] Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas 547 
periodically issues general orders that modify the percentage of divisional 
cases that are assigned to particular judges.43  The patent case assignment 
proportions in the Eastern District of Texas differ from the general civil 
case assignment proportions: a particular judge might be assigned 50 
percent of the general civil cases filed in Texarkana division, yet that 
same judge might be assigned 100 percent of the patent cases filed 
there.44 
Examining the most recent general order reveals numerous ways to 
choose a particular judge in the Eastern District of Texas.  If a litigant 
prefers Judge Ron Clark, for example, he or she need only file the case in 
Beaumont because Judge Clark is assigned 100 percent of patent cases 
filed in Beaumont.45  Prior to the most recent update of the district’s 
assignment procedures in December 2014, one could file a patent case in 
the Tyler division and enjoy a 95 percent chance of drawing Judge 
Leonard Davis (the other 5 percent of patent cases were assigned to Judge 
Michael H. Schneider).46  Before Judge T. John Ward, one of the most 
experienced patent district court jurists in the United States, stepped 
down from the bench, one could file in Marshall or Texarkana, where he 
drew 100 percent of the patent cases filed.47 
Judge Gilstrap, currently receives 80 percent of all cases filed in 
Marshall, whether they are patent cases or not;48 the other 20 percent of 
civil cases filed in Marshall are assigned to Judge Trey Schroeder.49  In 
addition to his heavy Marshall caseload, Gilstrap receives 20 percent of 
the civil cases filed in the Texarkana division as well as 30 percent of the 
patent cases filed in Tyler.50 
The result of this unique judge assignment system for patent cases is a 
predictable formula that litigants can use to select their preferred jurist.  
 
43. See id. at 311–12 (explaining that the fixed percentage of cases the Chief Judge assigns to 
each judge depends on “shifting workloads, recusals, new appointments, and retirements”). 
44. For examples of case assignment divisions, see General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal 
Actions 14-20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 2014), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?byYear=2014&location=general [hereinafter General 
Order, Dec. 2014] (dividing the cases assigned in the various districts of the Eastern District of 
Texas). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 8-08-15 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1925 [hereinafter General 
Order, Dec. 2008]. 
48. All criminal cases filed in Marshall are heard by Judge Gilstrap.  See General Order, Dec. 
2014, supra note 44 (assigning all Marshall criminal cases to Judge Gilstrap). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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Some regular patent infringement plaintiffs, including nonpracticing 
entities, consistently file in a single division to have their cases heard 
before the same judge.51  Indeed, two divisions receive a disproportionate 
amount of the patent filings in the district: filings in Tyler and Marshall 
constitute 91 percent of all patent filings in the Eastern District of 
Texas.52  Not coincidentally, those are the two divisions that Judge 
Gilstrap draws from for his docket, receiving 80 percent of the Marshall 
civil filings and 30 percent of the Tyler patent cases.53 
Because the district’s case assignment system permits judge shopping, 
many nonpracticing entities consistently select the same judge.  In fact, 
between 1999 and 2007, DataTreasury Corporation (“DataTreasury”), 
Orion IP ("Orion”), and IAP Intermodal LLC (“IAP”) collectively filed 
thirty-seven patent suits in the district.54  Each company filed every one 
of its lawsuits before a single judge: Judge David Folsom heard 
DataTreasury’s cases, Judge Davis heard Orion’s cases, and Judge Ward 
heard IAP’s cases.55 
Although the ratio of patent cases assigned to each judge constantly 
changes in the Eastern District of Texas,56 it is generally true that at any 
particular time, at least one division will send most of its patent cases to 
one judge.57  Likewise, it is almost always true that each division has no 
more than two judges handling the patent cases filed in any particular 
district.58  The selection of a division is much less involved than one 
might think.  When filing a complaint, the plaintiff simply selects his or 
her division from a drop-down menu of all of the divisions within the 
Eastern District of Texas.59  Thus, all that a plaintiff needs to do to select 
a particular judge for his or her case (or the high probability of a particular 
 
51. See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE 
J. L. & TECH. 193, 207 (2007) (discussing Judge Ward’s influence on the district); see id. at 214 
(explaining that the Eastern District of Texas has become the district of choice for patent trolls who 
prefer the local juries and the ability to bring almost all of their cases before the same judge). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 215 tbl.8. 
55. Id. 
56. Previous divisions of labor allowed even more blatant judge shopping.  See, e.g., General 
Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 09-20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2009), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=2256 [hereinafter General 
Order, Dec. 2009] (assigning many cases from one district to only one judge). 
57. Compare General Order, Dec. 2008, supra note 47, with General Order, Dec. 2014, supra 
note 44. 
58. See General Order, Dec. 2008, supra note 47 (assigning patent cases by division in the 
Eastern District of Texas). 
59. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 255. 
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judge), is look up the latest public order noting which cases the judge of 
his or her choice is hearing and select the corresponding division from 
the drop-down menu.60 
This situation permits litigants to have much more control over one of 
the primary motivations behind forum shopping: drawing the most 
advantageous judge possible.  Indeed, the assignment system in the 
Eastern District of Texas permits litigants to move beyond forum 
shopping to judge shopping.  Judge shopping permits litigants to select 
not only the most advantageous court (as does forum shopping), but also 
the single most important person in a trial: the judge.  In contrast to forum 
shopping, which has both critics and defenders, judge shopping is almost 
universally condemned by commentators and by judges themselves.61 
This divisional case assignment has engendered a lot of criticism about 
the Eastern District’s practices.  I have previously written about the 
competition that courts can engage in to attract litigants to their 
districts.62  I have noted that the ability to choose one’s judge can be used 
as a way to attract or dissuade patent litigants from filing in districts, a 
phenomenon that has occurred in the Eastern District of Texas.63  
Similarly, Dan Klerman and Greg Reilly have said: “There was no 
particular reason why patentees should be given a choice of division, 
much less a choice of judge, as patent cases almost never have a greater 
connection to one division of the Eastern District than another.”64  
Klerman and Reilly share my view that the Eastern District’s assignment 
procedures are nothing more than “judge shopping.”65 
Ultimately, the Eastern District of Texas’ own rules and assignment 
procedures enable judge shopping.  The local orders in the Eastern 
District of Texas assigning the patent cases from certain divisions allow 
litigants to effectively control which judge presides over their case.  
Before filing, litigants have not only checked the court’s local rules, but 
also the proclivities and tendencies of individual judges to gauge whether 
they will generally be favorable to their particular dispute.  For instance, 
with Judge Gilstrap, litigants know, ex ante, that he will set a scheduling 
conference about three months from the date of filing.66  Then, at the 
 
60. Id. 
61. See Norwood, supra note 23, at 300 (“[J]udge-shopping is still ‘universally condemned’ by 
the courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
62. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 659–61 (finding that courts engage in competition for patent 
litigants). 
63. Id. at 670–74. 
64. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 255–56. 
65. Id. at 255. 
66. Krochtengel, supra note 20. 
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scheduling conference, he will set a trial date about eighteen months 
later.67  Litigants know that all dates are hard dates, unlikely to be pushed 
back or delayed at the litigant’s request.68  The dates, however, are not 
set in stone, there is some flexibility; but that flexibility is meant to allow 
for changes due to the judge’s, not the litigants’, schedule.69  Judge 
Gilstrap uses approximate dates for trial to allow jury selection to happen 
on a weekly basis.70  This way, the court is able to handle settlements of 
various cases more efficiently and can keep churning through the cases.71 
Knowing all of that, litigants can decide if they like Judge Gilstrap’s 
procedures, and select their division accordingly.  And apparently, many 
plaintiffs like what they see.  Judge Gilstrap has become one of the most 
popular and clearly one of the most experienced patent judges in the 
world.  So what is wrong with judge shopping?  Part II addresses that 
question. 
II.  IS THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH JUDGE SHOPPING? 
Academic literature has generally adopted a dim view of granting 
plaintiffs the ability to select their judge.72  The legal system apparently 
shares the same disdain; there are many examples of attorneys being 
sanctioned because their actions were construed as an attempt to 
manipulate the system to receive a more favorable judge.73  Previous 
scholarship discusses the perniciousness of judge shopping for the legal 
system and argues that judge shopping is one of the advantages that courts 
can dangle before potential plaintiffs in an effort to compete for their 
litigation business.74  Scholars have warned that such competition 
between courts can lead to procedures that are overly plaintiff friendly.75 
Those in the bankruptcy field have leveled much of the academic 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis 
of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 971 (1999) 
(stating that “forum shopping . . . has received universal condemnation” and often leads to 
proceedings against the attorney shopping for judges). 
73. See, e.g., No Judge Shopping Allowed, 19 NAT’L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A8 (sanctioning an 
attorney for filing thirteen lawsuits for Dr. Jack Kevorkian and withdrawing all but one to secure a 
favorable judge). 
74. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 670–74 (reinforcing the argument that judge shopping 
provides an advantage for plaintiffs). 
75. Id.; see also Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 254 (similarly suggesting that judge 
shopping is advantageous for plaintiffs). 
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criticism of judge shopping.  In the 1980s, a good portion of large 
bankruptcy cases were filed in New York’s courts.  The dominance of the 
New York bankruptcy courts was short lived, however.  By the early 
1990s, Delaware had become the leader in big bankruptcy filings.76  Lynn 
LoPucki has chronicled how Delaware’s emergence as a bankruptcy 
court of choice was the result of the efforts of Delaware’s lone bankruptcy 
judge, Judge Helen Balick, to attract “a major industry to her state.”77  
Judge Balick’s case management techniques, along with the 
predictability of case assignment in a one-judge district, elevated 
Delaware to the top district for bankruptcy filings.78 
Bankruptcy scholars have generally been critical of Delaware and New 
York courts’ facilitation of judge shopping.79  In a series of articles and 
books, LoPucki has argued that Delaware and New York bankruptcy 
judges competed for litigants.80  LoPucki saves special criticism for judge 
shopping, however.  First, he and Theodore Eisenberg have complained 
that judge shopping threatens the integrity of the judicial system.81  Judge 
shopping, according to Eisenberg and LoPucki, breeds disrespect for the 
judicial system as defendants are disadvantaged when the plaintiff selects 
a judge.82 
Eisenberg and LoPucki are also concerned that judge shopping 
undermines the very structure of government.  They think that judge 
shopping somehow destroys the rule of law by making government 
 
76. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 682 (noting that Delaware had become the leader in 
bankruptcy case filings in 1992). 
77. Id. (arguing that Judge Balick actively pursued bankruptcy filings by making rulings 
favorable to bankruptcy filers). 
78. Id. (noting the appeal of filing in a one-judge district).  Because of the increase in filings, 
Delaware was awarded a second bankruptcy judge in 1993, but the district did not adopt the random 
case assignment model of New York.  See LOPUCKI, supra note 27, at 74–75.  The migration of 
big bankruptcy cases toward New York and Delaware alarmed bankruptcy professionals in other 
states.  Beginning in Houston, members of affected cities’ local bankruptcy bars approached their 
local bankruptcy judges and asked for changes in local rules and attorney fee rulings to make the 
local courts competitive.  Id. at 125–26. 
79. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on 
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (noting that the majority of complaints regarding venue 
shopping have been targeted at New York and Delaware). 
80. See LOPUCKI, supra note 27, at 74–75 (discussing the litigant competition with Delaware 
and New York bankruptcy judges); see also Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 72, at 983–84 
(discussing the shift from New York to Delaware as the principal destination for big-case forum 
shopping); Lynn LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 15 (noting 
that from 1979 to 1988, the most commonly selected forum for bankruptcy reorganization cases 
was New York City). 
81. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 72, at 971. 
82. Id. 
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dependent on individual personalities and proclivities rather than the rule 
of law.83  They are clearly worried about the perception of the judiciary 
being damaged by the practice of judge shopping.  Indeed, in the 
bankruptcy context there has been an outcry regarding the judge shopping 
practices of Delaware,84 perhaps confirming LoPucki’s concerns about 
judge shopping tarnishing the public image of the judiciary. 
The Federal Judicial Center released a draft report about bankruptcy 
forum shopping in 1997 that also condemned judge shopping.85  The 
report condemned Delaware’s informal method of case assignment.86  
The report was also very critical of Delaware’s practice of allowing 
debtor’s counsel to discover which judge a case would be assigned to 
before the case was filed.87 
Kimberly Jade Norwood discusses the similar theme of judge shopping 
outside of the bankruptcy context.88  According to Norwood, while there 
are positive views of forum shopping and jury shopping, there is no 
support for judge shopping.89  Furthermore, she has chronicled how the 
judicial system punishes would-be judge shoppers.90  The basis of the 
judicial system’s dislike of judge shopping stems from the fact that the 
practice “impairs the integrity of the judicial system and judicial 
process.”91  Norwood also cites case law to support her claim that judge 
shopping is impermissible in the United States.92  The impermissibility 
of judge shopping can be seen in a number of different ways.  Key among 
them, according to Norwood, is the random case assignment rules which 
are designed to prevent judge shopping.93  Like LoPucki, she is 
 
83. Id. (noting that judge shopping “undermines the aphorism that ‘ours is a government of 
laws, not men’”). 
84. See, e.g., Ann Davis, Delaware Lawyers to Discuss Changes with Federal Judges, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 29, 1997, at B8 (stating that Delaware’s procedures for bankruptcy cases would cause a 
layperson to doubt “the objectivity of the process”); Delaware’s Withdrawal of the Reference: What 
It Means, 30 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) No. 4, at A16 (Feb. 11, 1997) (discussing a bankruptcy 
judge’s declaration that he would not “tolerate [Delaware’s] practices here”). 
85. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum 
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 137678 (2000) (noting the negative 
opinion of the Federal Judicial Center on bankruptcy forum shopping). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (comparing the judicial system’s differing views 
on forum shopping and judge shopping). 
89. Norwood, supra note 23, at 268. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 268–69. 
92. Id. (citing In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
93. Id. at 299–300. 
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concerned that judge shopping might “cheapen the judicial process.”94  
Ultimately, she concludes that judge shopping is “universally 
condemned” by courts for good reasons.95 
But, there are proponents of judge shopping in the academy, although 
they are more difficult to find.  Robert Rasmussen and Randall Thomas 
argue that forum shopping and judge shopping can increase the efficiency 
of the Bankruptcy Code, if the timing of one’s judge selection predates 
financial distress.96  For them, judge shopping can be a virtue of the 
system.  Provided that one’s selection of a court or judge is made ex 
ante—which they define as meaning “prior to the onset of financial 
distress,”—they feel that judge shopping could improve the bankruptcy 
process.97  Rasmussen and Thomas’ argument should be a familiar one 
to students of the literature about specialized courts:98 judge shopping can 
be positive because it can efficiently align litigants with judges who have 
expertise in their cases.  Thus, by allowing judge shopping, the judicial 
system can maximize efficiency by allowing litigants to signal which 
judge or court they feel will be the best at deciding their cases.99 
The problem, of course, is that choice of judge is largely made by one 
party: the plaintiff.100  Ultimately, judge shopping is antithetical to the 
goals of the American legal system.  Virtually every court in the United 
 
94. Id. at 300. 
95. Id. (citing Lane v. City of Emeryville, No. 93-16646, 1995 WL 298614, at *2 (9th Cir. May 
16, 1995)). 
96. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 85, at 1359. 
97. Id. at 1363. 
98. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 44 (1995) (arguing that one of the benefits of 
specialized adjudication is the ability to match judges’ interests with a subject matter); Richard A. 
Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?  An Essay on Delegation and 
Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 790–91 (1983) (recognizing the 
practical effects of increasing the number of specialized courts); see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, 
SPECIALIZING THE COURTS (2011) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the growing trend 
toward specialization in the federal and state court systems). 
99. See BAUM, supra note 98, at 33 (stating that the judicial system can run more efficiently 
with more specialization). 
100. The defendants, of course, can choose to initiate a suit (and thus, choose the venue) by 
initiating a declaratory judgment action.  In practice, declaratory judgments are relatively rare, both 
because they require one to bring suit to affirm that one has not infringed (an awkward position for 
most declaratory judgment plaintiffs) and because the Federal Circuit has heightened the standards 
for bringing such suits.  See Megan M. La Belle, ‘Reverse’ Patent Declaratory Judgement Actions: 
A Proposed Solution for Medtronic, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 47 (2013) (listing the hurdles 
that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must clear to file a declaratory judgment action under Federal 
Circuit case law).  See generally Jennifer R. Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: 
The Federal Circuit’s Response to MedImmune v. Genetech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (2008) 
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s MedImmune v. Genetch case). 
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States implemented randomization of case assignment out of concern 
both for the public perception of judicial evenhandedness, and for actual 
fairness of deciding disputes.101  Permitting wide-spread judge shopping 
(similar to what occurs now in patent cases) allows plaintiffs to select the 
judge who is most favorable to them.102  Either because of special 
procedural rules, judicial temperament, or hostility to defendants, 
something makes that judge more attractive than every other judge.  
Judge shopping creates a system whereby the most plaintiff-friendly 
judge receives most of the cases.103 
Judge shopping has defenders, but those defenders for the most part do 
not reside in Congress.  If the benefits of judge shopping are so strong 
that the system wants to encourage patentees to seek after them, Congress 
should so indicate.  As of now, Congress has regularly opposed judge 
shopping (as has the Supreme Court), and has attempted to randomize 
intra-district assignment.104  The courts would do well to follow 
Congress’ lead in establishing their own assignment procedures. 
Essentially the only argument for judge shopping is that the practice 
provides a way to funnel cases toward specialization.  But even assuming 
that judge shopping could achieve that goal, it is unclear that 
specialization of the federal courts is an unalloyed good.  Specialization 
of the federal district courts can have beneficial effects and there have 
been calls for more specialization of judges at the trial level.105  Such 
specialization, however, should be thoughtfully produced, and should not 
be created haphazardly or as the result of a competition between courts.  
Judge Gilstrap has certainly developed an expertise over the years, but 
should one-fourth of the nation’s patent cases be heard by this one judge 
whose only experience with patent law has been through his time on the 
bench?  This specialization leads to the type of tunnel vision of which 
various academics have warned.106  With one judge, or a handful of 
judges handling most of the nation’s patent cases, the patent system does 
 
101. See Norwood, supra note 23, at 292 (stating that the main benefits of random assignment 
are to “prevent judge shopping,” to enhance “public confidence” in the judicial system, and to 
ensure “equitable distribution” of cases). 
102. Anderson, supra note 12, at 670–74; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 254. 
103. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 254. 
104. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the Judge Matter?  Exploiting Random Assignment on a 
Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 246, 
247 (2012). 
105. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2001) (proposing specialized trial courts for patent cases). 
106. J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (2014); J. Jonas 
Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151, 175 (2015); Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
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not benefit from the diverse viewpoints that most other areas of law 
receive. 
And all of this says nothing about the erosion of the public perception 
of the patent system that has occurred with the rise of the Eastern District 
of Texas.  Already the Eastern District has acquired a public reputation 
as a “renegade” district.107  Attracting nearly half of the United States’ 
patent cases (largely because of the court-sanctioned judge shopping that 
transpires there) will only further the public’s perception of the district. 
In conclusion, judge shopping is harmful to the judicial system because 
it: (1) undermines public confidence in the judiciary, (2) makes court an 
uneven playing field for litigants, (3) is a prime motivator of judicial 
competition for litigation, and (4) sacrifices a diversity of judicial 
viewpoints in setting patent policy. 
III.  WHAT TO DO: VENUE REFORM AND MANDATING RANDOMIZATION 
Thus, reforms of some sort are needed to the venue rules of patent law 
or the assignment procedures of the courts.  First, and most painlessly, 
Congress could mandate that district courts randomize assignment of 
patent cases within their districts.108  Limiting the ability of courts, such 
as the Eastern District of Texas, to deviate from random assignment 
procedures for patent cases would eliminate one of the most effective 
efforts to attract, or dissuade, patent litigants from filing in a court.109 
The Eastern District of Texas’ case assignment procedures for patent 
cases allow litigants to select the judge who will preside over their 
case.110  Districts that have this nonrandom assignment appeal to 
litigants, but in the end, disrupt the proper functioning of the judiciary.  
As described in more depth above, courts that enable judge shopping are 
often competing for cases, a competition which often leads to plaintiff 
friendly procedures and rulings.  This ability to “judge shop” has been 
uniformly decried as antithetical to notions of justice.111  LoPucki notes 
that the ability to “judge shop” was one of the features of the Delaware 
 
107. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for 
Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111 (2008) (describing that “renegade” reputation). 
108. This is slightly more complicated with the Patent Pilot Program, but even in that program, 
litigants have at best a one in three chance in getting assigned a particular judge, and often much 
less than that.  See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 253 (indicating that “the norm in federal 
courts” is to have “random assignment among judges within a district”). 
109. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 670 (stating that eliminating nonrandom assignment of 
cases will deter some of the forum shopping that occurs in patent cases). 
110. See supra Part II (noting that the Eastern District of Texas will lure patent litigants to file 
their cases there because the district allows litigants to choose their judges). 
111. See supra note 27 (listing academics and courts who have opposed judge shopping). 
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bankruptcy courts that initially appealed to bankruptcy filers.112  Similar 
to the plaintiffs in bankruptcy actions, patentees are also attracted to the 
option of choosing who their judge will be, as the Eastern District of 
Texas’ popularity demonstrates.  The appeal any district has to plaintiffs 
will often be a result of law or procedure that is designed to be plaintiff 
friendly. 
Congress could quite easily eliminate courts’ ability to permit 
preselection of judges.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, chief judges of district 
courts have the power to “assign the cases” in accordance with the rules 
and orders of the court.113  The statute grants chief judges broad 
discretion in assigning cases.  Congress could amend the statute to require 
that district courts assign cases in a randomized manner among the 
judges.  This modification would eliminate one of the primary judicial 
means of attracting litigants with very little cost, other than the political 
cost of passing legislation. 
Congress has shown an appetite for strengthening the randomization 
norms of case assignment.  The Patent Pilot Program (“PPP”), which 
allows certain districts to assign all of their patent cases to a preselected 
subset of judges, requires districts to assign judges in the program on a 
random basis.114  For most districts, this means using “the wheel” to 
assign judges to patent cases.  The PPP is intended to increase certain 
judge’s exposure to, and expertise with, patent cases while 
simultaneously ensuring random case assignment—albeit limited to the 
PPP judges of the district.115  But the Eastern District of Texas continues 
to use its unique assignment method for patent cases—in which litigants 
can choose the division from a drop-down menu that determines their 
odds of getting a certain judge.116 
Congress could legislate this pernicious form of judge shopping out of 
existence.  There are currently a number of bills that would amend the 
patent venue statute with the goal of getting litigation out of East 
 
112. See LOPUCKI, supra note 27, at 47–48 (noting that Delaware’s bankruptcy court was a 
boon for attracting litigants in the 1990s because litigants who filed in Delaware knew the judge 
for their case ex ante). 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012). 
114. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 12, at 256 (stating that the Patent Pilot Program instructs 
courts to “randomly assign” cases). 
115. See generally Nancy Olson, Does Practice Make Perfect?  An Examination of Congress’s 
Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55 UCLA L. REV. 745 (2007–2008) (discussing 
Congress’ intent behind the Patent Pilot Program). 
116. See supra Part II (discussing the Eastern District of Texas’ method of permitting judge 
selection). 
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Texas.117  It is also an issue that has attracted the interest of presidential 
candidates.  The 2016 Democratic Party presidential candidate, Hillary 
Clinton, had a plan to limit venue in patent cases, although the specifics 
of such a plan were not spelled out.118 
The Supreme Court also has the power to change how the Eastern 
District of Texas assigns its cases, although indirectly.  The Supreme 
Court has recently granted certiorari in a case that deals with patent 
venue: TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC.119  That 
case, which arises from a motion to transfer venue out of the District of 
Delaware, asks the court to clarify exactly which provision of the United 
States Code controls venue for patent cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) or 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b).120  The case will present the first opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to directly evaluate patent venue rules.121  Although the 
case does not involve the Eastern District of Texas, the briefing thus far 
has focused almost exclusively on the practices of that court.122  A 
fundamental change to patent venue may result, which would in effect 
“redistribut[e] patent infringement cases.”123 
But an easier—and arguably more effective—means of achieving a 
similar goal would be to eliminate judge shopping altogether.  This 
alteration of the Eastern District of Texas’ assignment procedures need 
not come from Congress.  The court itself can make this assignment 
procedure change with a simple memo from the chief judge.  A plaintiff 
might still choose the Eastern District of Texas, but Judge Gilstrap would 
 
117. See, e.g., Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th 
Cong. (2016) (proposing changes to the patent venue statute and designed to draw cases out of the 
Eastern District of Texas); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at 
the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 969–81 (2014) (showing that Congress has an active 
role to play in policing patent law). 
118. Matthew Bultman, Clinton Backs Patent Reform, New Venue Rules, LAW360 (June 28, 
2016, 6:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/811761/clinton-expresses-support-for-patent-
reform-new-venue-rules. 
119. 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 4944616 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) 
(No. 16-341). 
120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC, No. 16-341 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016). 
121. Of course, in addition to venue, a plaintiff needs to establish personal jurisdiction to 
proceed with a patent suit.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).  That can 
be especially difficult in patent cases, where the plaintiff only has the jurisdiction where the plaintiff 
obtained a patent.  See J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The Temporary Presence 
Exception and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008–
2009) (stating that a patentee may sue for infringement “only when that infringing act occurs in the 
same country in which the invention is patented”). 
122. Id. at 17–22 (evaluating literature critical of the Eastern District of Texas). 
123. Dennis Crouch, Goodbye E.D. Texas as a Major Patent Venue, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 14, 
2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/goodbye-patent-venue.html. 
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receive under 20 percent of all cases filed in the district.  This rebalancing 
of the district caseload would not only be a positive for the patent system, 
it would also be beneficial to the larger judicial system.  In fact, it is this 
voluntary option which would signal to Congress, the Federal Circuit, 
and the Supreme Court that the Eastern District of Texas is serious about 
joining the majority of the federal judiciary in eliminating judge 
shopping. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge shopping is a practice that has generally been frowned upon by 
courts and often leads to sanctions for attorneys.  But in recent years it 
has become a practice that is actively permitted by certain federal district 
courts, most notably, the Eastern District of Texas.  The ability to 
effectively choose a judge in the Eastern District has increased the 
district’s popularity among patent plaintiffs.  Currently the Eastern 
District of Texas receives 43 percent of all patent cases in the nation.124 
The most popular judge among the judges of the Eastern District is 
Judge Gilstrap.  Last year he received over one-fourth of the nation’s 
patent cases.  Judge Gilstrap is a well-respected, experienced, and serious 
judge.  But even the best judge should not receive a quarter of the nation’s 
patent cases in the United States.  If Congress desires specialization in 
patent trials, they should thoughtfully consider how to achieve judges 
with patent specialization (e.g., judges that resemble bankruptcy judges 
or a Federal Circuit-like experiment at the district court level).125  But 
regardless of what form the congressional reform of the patent trial 
system takes, it should be done in a thoughtful manner, not dependent on 
plaintiff’s venue choices.  Any congressional reform to the patent venue 
statute should mandate that districts have randomized case assignment 
procedures. 
Two other alternatives exist to congressional change of patent venue.  
The Supreme Court is currently scheduled to hear arguments in TC 
Heartland LLC, a case about patent venue.  There, the Court may decide 
to limit the venue options that a plaintiff has in patent infringement 
cases.126  A severe restriction on venue options would reduce the appeal 
 
124. Howard, supra note 1. 
125. There are advantages and drawbacks to both systems of specialized judges that are beyond 
the scope of this article.  For more, see generally J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 401, 446–51 (2016) (highlighting the risk of increased lobbying by judges from specialized 
courts). 
126. Of course, predicting what the Supreme Court will do in any case is risky business, and I 
do not presuppose what the Justices will do in that case.  The question of patent venue is a 
complicated one.  The Justices may well decide that they do not want to disrupt the apple cart.  See 
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of judge shopping in the Eastern District by limiting the number of cases 
that the court has authority over. 
Finally, the Eastern District could limit the ability of plaintiffs to shop 
for friendly judges.  By imposing some true randomization into its judge 
selection procedure, the district could go a long way toward eliminating 
judge shopping.  One might question whether eliminating judge shopping 
(and thus part of the appeal of the district to plaintiffs) is what the district 
ultimately wants.  The Eastern District can halt the practice of judge 
shopping on its own. If it is unwilling to do so, legislative action by 
Congress may be required. 
 
J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 267, 268–69 (2015) (illustrating the Supreme Court’s trouble with enunciating a workable 
standard for patent-eligible subject matter). 
